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Aspects o f Rationalizable Behaviour
P eter  J. Ham mond
Department of Economics, Stanford University, CA 94305-6072, U.S.A.
December 1991; revised April 1992. Based on part of a course given at the 
Università degli Studi, Florence in January and February 1991, as well as an 
invited lecture at the International Conference on Game Theory and Applications 
held at the European University Institute in June 1991. This is a draft of chapter 
intended for Ken Binmore, Alan Kirman, and Piero Tani (eds.) Frontiers of Game 
Theory (to be published by M.I.T. Press).
ABSTRACT
Equilibria in games involve common “rational” expectations, which are sup­
posed to be endogenous. Apart from being more plausible, and requiring less 
common knowledge, rationalizable strategies may be better able than equilibria 
to capture the essential intuition behind both correlated strategies and forward 
induction. A version of Pearce’s “cautious” rationalizability allowing correlation 
between other players’ strategies is, moreover, equivalent to an iterated procedure 
for removing all strictly, and some weakly dominated strategies. Finally, as the 
effect of forward induction in subgames helps to show, the usual description of a 
normal form game may be seriously inadequate, since other considerations may 























































































































































































1.1. Common Expectations Equilibrium
For much of its history, game theory has been pursuing an enormously ambi­
tious research program. Its aim has been nothing less than to describe equilibrium 
outcomes for every game. This involves not only a specification of each player’s 
behaviour or choice of strategy, but also of what beliefs or expectations justify that 
behaviour. The crucial feature of equilibrium expectations is that they correspond 
to a single common joint probability distribution over all players’ strategy choices. 
This makes it natural to speak of common expectation3 equilibrium. Moreover, 
these expectations must be rational in the sense that each player is believed to 
play, with probability one, some optimal strategy given the conditional joint prob­
ability of all the other players’ strategies. Indeed, this is the essential idea behind 
Aumann’s (1987) notion of correlated equilibrium. If one also imposes stochas­
tic independence between the probability beliefs concerning strategy choices by 
different players, then each common expectations or correlated equilibrium with 
this property is a Nash equilibrium, and conversely. Thus, the crucial feature 
of both Nash and correlated equilibrium is the existence of common “rationed” 
expectations. In the case of games of imperfect information, the same is true 
of a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium with a common prior, as considered by Harsanyi 
(1967-8). Refinements of Nash equilibrium, including subgame perfect, trembling 
hand perfect, proper, sequential, and stable equilibria, all incorporate the same 






































































































Battle o f  the Sexes
1.2. Battle of the Sexes, and Holmes v. Moriarty
The restrictiveness of such common expectations equilibrium can be illus­
trated by two classic games. The first is “Battle of the Sexes” , as presented by 
Luce and Raiffa (1957) and often considered since. As is well known, this game 
between the two players Row (R ) and Column (C ) has three Nash equilibria in 
which:
(1) Row and Column play (A, a) and get (2,1);
(2) Row and Column play (B , b) and get (1,2);
(3) Row and Column play the mixed strategies (| A +  j  B, | a +  | ft), and get 
expected payoffs (|, |).
Knowing that these are the three Nash equilibria does little to help select among 
them. Moreover, while observing the strategy choices (A, a) or (B ,b) might help 
to reinforce our belief in equilibrium theory, how are we to interpret an observa­
tion of ( B ,a ) or of (A, 6)? Did these anomalous observations arise because the 
players followed the mixed strategies of the third Nash equilibrium and experience 
misfortune on this occasion? Or if (A, b) is observed, is that because R hoped that 
the equilibrium would be (A, a) whereas C hoped that it would be (B , 6)? And if 
(B ,a ) is observed, is that because R  feared that the equilibrium would be (B ,b) 
while C  feared it would be (A, a)?
A second classic game is von Neumann and Morgenstem’s (1953, pp. 176-8) 
simple model of one small part of the story concerning Sherlock Holmes’ attempts 




























































































and his criminal associates arrested.1 According to this simple model Moriarty 
wants to catch Holmes, while Holmes wants to escape to Dover and then to the 
Continent. As Holmes boards a train heading from London to Dover, he sees 
Moriarty on the platform and sees that Moriarty sees him, and sees him seeing 
Moriarty, etc.2 Holmes knows that Moriarty will hire a special train to overtake 
him. The regular train has just one stop before Dover, in Canterbury. Given the 
payoffs which von Neumann and Morgenstern chose in order to represent Holmes’ 
and Moriarty’s preferences, this involves the two person zero-sum bimatrix game 
shown. Here H  denotes Holmes, M  denotes Moriarty, and each has the strategy D 











Holmes v. M oriarty
The unique equilibrium of this simplified game has Moriarty stop his special 
train in Canterbury with probability 0.4, but go on to Dover with probability 0.6, 
while Holmes should get off the ordinary train in Canterbury with probability 0.6 
and go directly to Dover with probability 0.4. In fact, Conan Doyle had Holmes 
(and Watson) get out at Canterbury and take hiding as Moriarty’s special train
1 I am indebted to Kenneth Arrow for reminding me o f  this example which I had forgotten 
long ago. For the full story, including Holmes’ finding himself in Florence sometime in May 
1891, see "The Final Problem”  in Sir Arthur Conan D oyle ’s Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes, followed 
by “The Adventure o f  the Empty House”  in the same author’s The Return o f Sherlock Holmes. 
Morgenstern seems to have been fond o f  this example, since he had already used it twice before 
—  see Morgenstern (1928, p. 98, and 1935, p. 343) [and note that the reference to the latter in 
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953, p. 176) is slightly inaccurate],
2 Actually, in “The Final Problem”  it is not at all clear that Moriarty does see Holmes, who 
had after all taken the precaution o f  disguising himself as “ a venerable Italian priest’ ’ so effectively 
as to fool his constant companion Dr. Watson. Nevertheless, Moriarty acted as though he knew 




























































































rushed through the station on its way to Dover. Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
observe that this is the closest pure strategy profile to their mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium, but that the latter gives Holmes only a 0.52 chance of escaping. In 
fact, who is to say that Holmes did not do better? He predicted that Moriarty 
would head straight to Dover, thinking perhaps that he had to reach it at all 
costs in time to intercept Holmes before he could escape quickly, while believing 
(correctly) that he could still catch Holmes later even if Holmes did get off at 
Canterbury and proceed more slowly to the Continent. What this shows, I suppose, 
is partly that von Neumann and Morgenstern’s model is excessively simplified. 
But it also calls into question their advocacy of mixed strategies in such complex 
situations. Though pursuit games can involve bluff, just as poker does, there is 
much else to consider as well.
In the first of these two games there is as yet no good story of how one of the 
three Nash equilibria is to be reached. In the second, even though there is a single 
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, it is by no means obvious that this describes 
the only possible set of rational beliefs which the players might hold about each 
other.
1.3. Rationalizable Strategic Behaviour
Fortunately, work on “rationalizable strategic behaviour” initiated during the 
early 1980’s by Bernheim (1984, 1986) and Pearce (1984) (and in their earlier 
respective Ph. D. theses) offers us a way out of the predicament. Actually, their 
approach is quite closely related to Farquharson’s (1969, ch. 8 and Appendix II) 
earlier idea (in his 1958 D. Phil, thesis) that one should eliminate all (weakly) 
dominated strategies repeatedly, and consider anything left over as a possible 
strategy choice. A partial link between these ideas will be discussed in Section 
3 below. In both Battle of the Sexes and Morgenstem’s version of Holmes v. 
Moriarty, any pair of strategy choices by both players is rationalizable. However, 
before we can say what is really rational, we have to say much more about players’ 




























































































equilibrium is indeed plausible when there is good reason for the players to have 
the particular common expectations underlying that equilibrium. But if there 
is no particularly good reason for them to have such common expectations, a 
Nash equilibrium has no more obvious claim to our attention than does any other 
profile of rationalizable strategies with associated divergent beliefs for the different 
players.
1.4. Outline of Paper
The rest of this paper will study some implications of relaxing the hypothesis 
that expectations are held in common by all players, and so of allowing that any 
profile of rationalizable strategies could occur. Section 2 begins by considering 
iteratively undominated strategies. Thereafter, it provides a concise definition of 
rationalizable strategies, and explains how they form a subset of those strategies 
that survive iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies. An example shows 
that this rationalizability is too weak a criterion, however, because it allows players 
to use strategies which are strictly dominated in subgames, but not in the whole 
game. Accordingly, Pearce’s more refined concept of “cautious rationalizability” 
is recapitulated for later use. It is also shown how strategies are cautiously ratio­
nalizable only if they survive a “cautious” version of iterative deletion of weakly 
dominated strategies.
Thereafter, Section 3 will consider correlated strategies, and argue that there 
is more scope for these in connection with divergent expectations than with the 
common expectations that underlie a correlated equilibrium. It is somewhat im­
plausible for players to believe, even in the absence of a correlation device, that 
their own strategies are correlated with those of other players. But it is entirely 
reasonable for one player to believe that strategies of other players axe correlated 
with each other. The common expectations hypothesis forces these two kinds of 
correlation to be synonymous, but in games with three or more players the ideas 
Eire quite different when players’ expectations Eire allowed to diverge. Moroever, 




























































































strictly dominated strategies for each player iteratively. And the set of all corre­
lated cautiously rationalizable strategies can be found by “cautiously” iterating 
the rule of removing weakly dominated strategies.
Though rationalizability appears to be a coarsening instead of a refinement 
of Nash equilibria, there are cases when it helps to establish a refined equilibrium, 
as both Bernheim (1984, p. 1023) and Pearce (1984, p. 1044) pointed out. Indeed, 
as Section 4 argues, the arguments behind forward induction make much more 
sense when players are allowed to be uncertain about what happens in a subgame, 
instead of having in mind some definite Nash or sequential equilibrium. The 
arguments that help sustain forward induction, however, also point to a serious 
weakness of orthodox game theory. For it turns out that players’ expectations in 
a subgame may well be influenced by the opportunities which they know other 
players have foregone in order to reach the subgame. Indeed, such is the essence 
of forward induction. But then it follows that the subgame is not adequately 
described by the strategy sets and payoff functions, or even by its extensive form 
tree structure. Important information about what happened before the subgame 
started is missing from the usual description of a game, and such information could 
also be relevant to the whole game, since that is presumably a subgame of some 
larger game which started earlier.
Iterative removal of all weakly dominated strategies has often been criticized 
as leading to implausible outcomes. Some of these objections are based on ex­
amples due to van Damme (1989) and also to Ben-Porath and Dekel (1988) of 
how the opportunity to “burn money” at the start of a game can significantly 
influence its outcome, even though that opportunity is never actually used. Dekel 
and Fudenberg (1990) discuss another similar example. Though cautious ratio­
nalizability is generally different from iterative removal of all weakly dominated 
strategies, in these particular examples it actually leads to identical outcomes. Ac­
cordingly, Section 4 also provides a brief discussion of these examples. It is claimed 




























































































implausible than has previously been suggested.
Section 5 offers some brief concluding remarks.
2. Iteratively Undominated and Rationalizable Strategies
2.1. Iteratively U ndom inated Strategies
Consider a normal form game (N , A N,v N), where N  is a finite set of players 
who each have specified finite (action) strategy spaces Ai, and A N denotes the 
Cartesian product space n .g/y  Ai of strategy profiles, while v N =  jv is a list 
of all individuals’ payoff functions tq : A N —* & which depend on the strategy 
profile aN £ A N.
Given any product set K N =  A', C A N of strategy profiles, tuny player
i 6 IV, and any pair a,, a' £ I\, of i ’s pure strategies, say that a< strictly dom­
inates a[ relative to K N if a_j) > v ,(a ',a_ ,) for all combinations a_j =
(ay)j e /v\{,} 6 K -i  :=  n>gat\{»} K j other players’ pure strategies. And
say that dj weakly dominates a' relative to K N if Uj(aj,a_i) >  t>i(aj,a_i) for all 
a_, £ K -i ,  with strict inequality for at least one such a_,. Then let S i(K N) (resp. 
W i(K N)) denote the members of K, that are not strictly (resp. weakly) dominated 
by other members of i f ,  relative to K N. Also, let S (K N) and W (K N) denote the 
respective product sets riigjv S ,(K N) and Ilie/vr
Next, for each positive integer k =  1 ,2 ,3 ,..., let Sk( K N) :=  S(Sk~1( K N)) 
be defined recursively, starting from S °(K N) :=  K N. In the case when K N =  A N, 
write Sk for Sk(A N), and let Sk denote player i ’s component of the product space 
Sk =  n .g /v  5*1 is the set of all i ’s strategies that remain after k rounds of 
removing all the strictly dominated strategies of every player. Evidently
0 *  s k C Sk~l C . . . C S ]  C S ° =  Ai (k =  3 ,4 ,.. .) .
Therefore, because each player’s Ai is a finite set, the limit set 




























































































must be well defined and non-empty. Actually, there must exist some finite n for 
which Sk =  S " for allt 6 N  and all integers k >  n. Moreover, the same arguments 
apply to the sets W k of strategies that survive k rounds of removing all the weakly 
dominated strategies of every player, and for the limit sets IV,00.
Finally, to prepare the ground for the later discussion of cautious rationaliz- 
ability, another iterative rule for removing dominated strategies needs to be consid­
ered. This involves the recursive definition that starts from (W  S °°)0(A ‘V) :=  A N 
and continues with
(W  5 °°)* (A n ) :=  W (S°°(( W Soa)k- 1(A N))) (A: =  1 ,2 ,3 ,.. .) ,
where S °°(K N) :=  Sk( K N), of course. Also, (IV S°°)k(A N) can be written 
as the Cartesian product I7ieiV 5°°)*. Arguing as before, this recursion con­
verges in a finite number of steps, so that each player ! £ IV has a well defined 
non-empty limit set
OO
(W  5 °° )^  :=  P|(W  5°°)*.
*=o
In what follows, (IV S’o0)f° will be described as the set of t’s strategies that survive 
cautious iterative deletion of dominated strategies. Evidently, the construction of 
this limit set begins with removing strictly dominated strategies iteratively, in 
order to arrive at Sf° for each player. But whenever the process of removing 
strictly dominated strategies gets stuck because there are no more to remove, the 
procedure passes on to the next stage which consists of just one round of removing 
all the weakly dominated strategies of every player. After this single round, it 
reverts immediately to removing strictly dominated strategies iteratively. Since the 
process can get stuck many times, in fact strategies that are only weakly dominated 
may have to be removed repeatedly. But such weakly dominated strategies are 
removed only “cautiously,” in the sense that they must remain inferior even after 




























































































As general notation, given any measurable set T, let A (T ) denote the set of 
all possible probability distributions over T. Now, for any probability distribution 
Ki £ A (A _ ,) which represents player i ’s beliefs about other players’ strategies 
a_j 6 A _ ,, let
E * , V i ( a i , a - i )  :=  ^  » i ( a - i )  Vi(ai, a - i )
denote, for each a, £ A,, the expected value of v, with respect to tt,. Then i ’s best 
response correspondence is defined by
B,(ir,) :=  argmax {E*,. v ;(a i,a_i)}.
a, € At
The sets R, (i £ N ) of rationalizable strategies are now constructed recursively 
as follows (see Pearce, 1984, p. 1032, Definition 1, find compare Bemheim, 1984, 
p. 1015). First, let R°, :=  A, for each player i. Then let
(i e A r ’ f c = i >2’ - ) -
Thus Rj consists of all player i ’s possible best responses, given the various beliefs 
that i might have about the strategies chosen by the other players from the sets 
R° =  A j  (j  ^  i). Next, consists of all i ’s possible best responses given the 
various beliefs about the strategies chosen by other players from Rl ( j  ^  i), and so 
on. Evidently 0 ^  R* C R*~l ( k =  1 ,2 ,...) , as can readily be proved by induction 
on k. It follows that each player i £ N  has a well defined limit set
OO
Ri :=  lim fi* =  O  Rlk—*oo * 1k=0
This completes the construction. Indeed, because each set Aj is finite, the 
limit Rj is reached after a finite number of iterations, and is non-empty. Since 
there is a finite number of players, moreover, there is a finite integer n, independent 
of i, for which k >  n implies Rj =  7J* (all t £ N). But then
* - * ( n js„U(|Aw>)




























































































so that rationalizable strategies are best responses to possible beliefs about other 
players’ rationalizable strategies. The following result is also easy to prove:
THEOREM. Every strategy which is used with positive probability in some Nash 
equilibrium must be rationalizable. That is, i f  E  C PJieiV A (A j) denotes the set 
o f possible Nash equilibrium beliefs that players can hold about each other, and 
if for any player i G N, the set E, is defined as { a; € A, | 3nN =  (7r,)lg^ G E : 
7rj(aj) >  0 }, then E ; C Ri-
PROOF: Let be any Nash equilibrium, where if; G A (A ,) (all
i G N ). Let A; :=  { a, G A, | itj (a,-) > 0 }  be the set of strategies used by i 
with positive probability in this Nash equilibrium. Then A, C B i(t - i ) ,  where 
Tt-i :=  rTjeyv\{■} Since R° =  A,, obviously A, C R® (all i G N ). Now suppose
that the induction hypothesis A, C if*-1 (all i G N) is satisfied. Then
a c Re.,» c b. (nJwm an,)) c b. (niW,„ **r>) -
Thus Aj C R^ for k =  1 ,2 ,.. .,  by induction on k, and so A; C Ri as required.
So all Nash strategies are rationalizable. But, as Bernheim’s (1984, pp. 1024- 
5) Cournot oligopoly example clearly shows, other non-Nash strategies are often 
rationalizable too.
Since a strictly dominated strategy is never a best response, for k =  1 ,2 ,.. .  
it must be true that all strictly dominated strategies for player t are removed from 
r t f ' 1 in reaching R f. It follows easily by induction on k that R* is a subset of S*, 
the set of i ’s strategies that survive k iterations of removing strictly dominated 
strategies. Taking the limit as k —* oo implies that R, must be a subset of Sf°, 
the set of all t’s strategies that survive iterative removal of strictly dominated 
strategies. Generally, however, f?, Sf°, though the two sets Eire always equal in 





























































































Rationalizability on its own fails to exclude some very implausible strategy 








Evidently, d is an optimal strategy for player II whenever the subgame is reached. 
But D  is player I’s best response to d, and a is one of player II’s best responses to 
D, while A  is player I’s best response to a. Thus all strategies are possible best 
responses and so rationalizable in this game. In the normal form, moreover, there 
are no strictly dominated strategies. Yet a is not a credible choice by Player II. In 
fact, a is strictly dominated in the subgame which starts with Player IPs move. If 
only d is really rationalizable for II, however, then only D  is for player I, so the only 
really rationalizable choices are (D ,d ). This illustrates subgame rationalizability 
(Bemheim, 1984, p. 1022).
The argument of the above paragraph exploited the extensive form structure 
of the game. But there are similar normal form arguments such as that used 
by (Bernheim, 1984, p. 1022) to discuss “perfect rationalizability” . This paper, 
however, will instead make use of Pearce’s (1984) idea of refining rationalizable to 
“cautiously rationalizable” strategies. To explain this construction, first let A °(T ) 
denote, for any finite set T, the interior of A (X ) — i.e., the set of all probability 
distributions attaching positive probability to every member of X. Then, starting 
with R° :=  R,, the set of i ’s rationalizable strategies, construct the sets R* recur­
sively as the set of rationalizable strategies in the normal form game where each 
player is i £ IV is artificially restricted to choosing some strategy a, in the set
Bi




























































































Arguing as in the case of the rationalizable sets R, explained above, one can 
readily prove by induction on k that 0 A* C A*-1 (k =  1 ,2 ,.. .) ,  so there must 
be a finite integer n such that k > n implies A* =  A". The sets
R, :=  H  =  A "
k—0
must therefore be well defined ruid non-empty. Moreover A f C R f  (i € N ; k =  
0 ,1 ,2 ,.. .) ,  so that A, C R,- Call A, the set of cautiously rationalizable strategies. 
Evidently
so that any player’s cautiously rationalizable strategies are indeed cautious best 
responses to non-degenerate probability beliefs about other players’ cautiously 
rationalizable strategies.
Because only strategies that are rationalizable among best responses to inte­
rior probability distributions are retained in passing from the sets A f_1 to A*, it 
follows that all weakly dominated strategies in A*-1 are eliminated immediately. 
Thus the product set R k := ri;e/v A* must be a subset of VU(Ai_1). Thereafter, 
all strategies among W (R k~l ) that would be removed by iterative strict domi­
nance must also be removed from B, (n>6N\{i} A °(A *_1 in order to arrive at 
strategies that are rationalizable when each player is i £ N  is artificially restricted 
to choosing some strategy in this set. It follows that in fact A* is a subset of 
the set S °°(W (A 1-1)) of those strategies that survive the removal of all weakly 
dominated strategies at the first stage, followed by iterated removal of all strictly 
dominated strategies at each later stage. Ultimately, moreover, A, must be a sub­
set of the set (W  S °°)f° of t’s strategies that survive cautious iterative removal of 
dominated strategies.3
3 Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) justify the strategy set S°°W(AN) as the implication of mod­
ifying iterative deletion of all weakly dominated strategies at each round so as to allow each 
player to be a little uncertain about other players’ payoffs. Though the motivation would have 
to be different, (W S°°)°°W (AN) is a refinement of their concept, and is obviously related to a 




























































































In the following, I shall use the obvious notation
R -i :=  TT Ry, A_( := TT Rj
for the sets of all possible profiles of rationalizable (resp. cautiously rationaliz­
able) strategies that the players other than i are able to choose. Now, if a strat­
egy »i € Ri is rationalizable, it is because there exists a probability distribution 
7Tj G over other players’ rationalizable strategies such that s, G B,(7Tj).
Similarly, if a strategy s, G R, is cautiously rationalizable, it is because there 
exists an interior probability distribution 7Tj G A °(R _ j) over other players’ cau­
tiously rationalizable strategies such that s, G B,(n,). If player i has a subjective 
probability distribution satisfying 7T, G A (fJ -i), therefore, then i will be described 
as having rationalizable expectations. This accords with the terminology intro­
duced by Bemheim (1984, p. 1025). Similarly, if in fact 7t* G A °(R~i), then i will 
be described as having cautiously rationalizable expectations. Moreover, given any 
7Tj G A (R -i)  for which the strategy G B ((xj) is a best response, the expectations 
7r, will be described as rationalizing that strategy.
3. Correlated Strategies
3.1. Background
Aumann (1987) has proposed an interesting extension to Nash equilibrium. 
A correlated equilibrium is a joint probability distribution f  G A (A iV), possibly 
with correlation between different players’ strategies, with the property that, for 
all i G N, whenever aN G A N satisfies n(aN) >  0, then
a, G argmax { E„.(.|aj)Vj(aj, a_j) }.
a.S/t,
Here 7r(-|aj) G A (A _ ,) denotes the conditional distribution of other players’ strate­





























































































equilibrium is consistent with the two players in Battle of the Sexes choosing (A, a) 
with probability half, and (B ,b ) with probability half.
Though Aumann argues quite persuasively for this “coarsening” of the usual 
Nash equilibrium concept, it does create some serious conceptual problems. For 
how can the two players ensure that their strategy choices are perfectly corre­
lated, as they must be in the above correlated equilibrium of Battle of the Sexes? 
Effectively, after all, player R  is required to believe that whatever causes her to 
choose A also causes C  to choose a, and vice versa. Similarly for B and b. These 
beliefs appear highly implausible in the absence of a correlation device. Of course, 
if there really is a correlation device, such as traffic lights at a busy cross-roads, 
then that should be modelled as an explicit feature of the game, so that players’ 
strategies can be conditioned by the information provided by the correlation de­
vice. Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) do suggest that it is legitimate to consider 
correlated strategies even where it is understood only implicitly that there may 
be a correlation device which is not explicitly modelled within the game. This, 
however, seems unsatisfactory because it is not clear how much correlation is really 
possible on the basis of the unmodelled device.
Actually, the beliefs behind correlated equilibria are somewhat reminiscent of 
those that underlie “causal decision theory” , as discussed by Nozick (1969) and 
others —  see Campbell and Sowden (1985) as well as Gardenfors and Sahlin (1988, 
Part V). There is an important difference from causal decision theory, however. 
This arises because correlated equilibrium requires each player to choose a strat­
egy that maximizes conditional expected utility, holding expectations about other 
players’ strategies fixed. Whereas in Newcomb’s problem, for instance, it is as­
sumed that one player’s choice can somehow cause the choice of a second player to 
change, so that it is rational for both players to take this possibility into account. 
In fact, causal decision theory would suggest that each player ! 6 N  should choose 
an Hi to maximize En.(.|ai)U,(a,, a_ ,) with respect to a;, instead of maximizing 




























































































The difference is whether the relevant expectations are described by x( | a j ) ,  which 
the action a; causes to vary, or by jr(-|a,) instead, which remains fixed even as a* 



















D 0 1 D 0 1
0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
Correlated Rationalizability
Neither causal decision theory nor correlated equilibrium makes much sense 
to me, at least. Still, as Pearce (1984, p. 1048), Bemheim (1986) and many others 
have realized, that does not rule out the possibility of each player’s strategy choice 
being rationalized by correlated beliefs about all the other players’ strategies. 
Indeed, consider the game shown, in which player I ll ’s intial choice of strategy a 
or 0  determines whether the left or the right tri-matrix will occur. In this game, it 
makes very good sense for player III to take a view regarding how likely it is that 
players I and II can co-ordinate their strategies and choose either (U,l) or (D ,r ) 
with high probability. A player III who thinks this is likely will want to choose 
a  and go to the left hand tri-matrix; but one who thinks it unlikely will want to 
choose 0  and go to the right hand tri-matrix instead. Constraining Ill ’s beliefs to 
exclude tiny such possibility of correlation does not seem reasonable, since player 
III may believe that there really is some common causation behind I and II’s 
behaviour, even if there is no correlation device or other means of communication. 




























































































matching choices. Or player III may know that I and II were able to communicate 
at some time in the past, before the start of this game.
The important point to realize is this. With common expectations, if any 
two players i , j  £ N  have correlated strategy choices, then i must believe that the 
likelihood of j ’s choice is conditioned on i ’s own choice. Without common expecta­
tions, however, any two players can believe that what they choose is independent 
of the other’s strategy, even though any third player may regard their choices as 
stochastically dependent. As an example, identical twins probably feel that they 
Me always choosing independently, even though outside observers and third play­
ers only see them making identical choices. And suppose there is a group of people 
who, because they have agreed in the prist about what to do in a game which con­
fronts them later, are believed by outsiders to be playing correlated strategies. 
Nevertheless, this group will not actually be able to correlate their choices in that 
game, unless its structure explicitly allows further communication.
Allowing correlated beliefs about the strategies of others makes more strate­
gies rationalizable, of course. Indeed, it weakens rationalizability so that it be­
comes what Brandenbuger and Dekel (1987) called correlated rationalizability. It 
has become well known that this is equivalent to iterated removal of strictly dom­
inated strategies — see, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 52). In other 
words, the set 77, of rationalizable strategies expands to become equal to 5f°. 
Allowing correlated beliefs also weakens cautious rationalizability so that R, be­
comes equal to (W  S°°)°° —  as can be seen from the fact (Pearce, 1984, p. 1049, 
Lemma 4) that a strategy is not weakly dominated iff it is a cautious best response. 
Pearce proves this only for two-person games, but remarks how the same proof 
would work for n-person games if correlated beliefs about other players’ strategies 
were allowed.




























































































THEOREM. A strategy is correlated rationalizable if  and only if it survives iterative 
removal o f strictly dominated strategies, and is cautiously correlated rationalizable 
if and only if it survives cautious iterative removal o f dominated strategies.
4. Forward Induction and Conditional Rationalizability
Forward induction was first introduced by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). The 
discussion here begins, therefore, with a special case of the example they present 
in Figure 3 on p. 1008. I have taken x =  0 to make the example into a “team 
decision problem” (Marschak and Radner, 1972) with both players sharing the 
same payoffs. An earlier example by Kohlberg with some of the same features 
(though not a team decision problem) was discussed by Kreps and Wilson (1982, 




A  Team Version o f  K oh lberg ’s Example
In this example, the obvious strategy choices (U,L ) form one Nash equilib­
rium, but (A ,R ) is another. Indeed, both (U,L) and (A ,Jl) are sequential equi­
libria. The strategies A, U for I and L, R  for II are therefore rationalizable. Now, 
for player I strategy D  is strictly dominated by A. Yet, sifter the strictly domi­
nated strategy D  has been eliminated, R  becomes a weakly dominated strategy for 
player II, and so an incautious best response. After it has been eliminated next, 













































































































of all weakly dominated strategies among those that remain rationalizable leads 
ultimately to (U,L) as the only possible outcome. By our previous theorem, this 
is also the only cautiously rationalizable outcome.
The forward induction argument of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, p. 1013), 
however, seems quite different, at least to begin with. They write that “a sub­
game should not be treated as a separate game, because it was preceded by a 
very specific form of preplay communication —  the play leading to the subgame.” 
Yet, according to the standard view of Nash equilibrium and, more particularly, 
of sequential equilibrium, there is no reason for such preplay communication to 
be relevant at all. Indeed, the sequential equilibrium which the players are sup­
posed to be following prescribes beliefs in every possible subgame, and as long as 
these fulfil all the requirements of sequential equilibrium, there is nothing more 
that equilibrium theory can say.4 In fact, Kohlberg and Mertens expect player 
II, when required to move, to be influenced by the fact that player I has given 
up an opportunity to get a payoff of 2. Though their argument is rather sketchy, 
it seems that we are expected to conclude that it is reasonable for player II, 
faced with the move, to believe that player I was expecting to get at least 2 
in the subgame. Yet, according to sequential equilibrium theory, there really is 
no reason for player II to abandon the beliefs that sustain (A, R) as the antic­
ipated sequential equilibrium; instead, I’s playing B  is seen as a mere “trem­
ble” .
It seems to me, therefore, that this kind of forward induction argument makes 
much more sense when we think of rationalizable strategies. The same point, in 
fact, was suggested by Bemheim and Pearce themselves, and also appears more 
recently in Battigalli (1991). The theory of rationalizability allows us to recognize 
that player II may not be certain after all what will happen in the subgame where 
there is a move to make, and will be looking for clues concerning what is likely to
4 It should be emphasized that neither Kreps and Wilson (1982) nor McClennan (1985) really 
contradict this, since they use the earlier version o f  Kohlberg’s example only to argue that it may 




























































































happen. In the subgame all strategies are rationalizable, and so II has no infor­
mation within the subgame itself which helps decide whether I is more likely to 
play U or D. However, there is crucial information from outside the subgame — 
namely, the fact that I has chosen B  rather than A, so giving up the opportunity 
to get 2 for sure. In the framework of rationalizability, the above quotation from 
Kohlberg and Mertens makes excellent sense — much more, it seems to me, than if 
one considers only sequential equilibria, where it is presumed that players already 
have equilibrium beliefs, and so cannot possibly be influenced by any form of “pre­
play communication.” In fact, knowing that player I has foregone the opportunity 
to get a payoff of 2, it is plausible for player II to believe that player I is expecting 
a payoff of at least 2 in the subgame. This is only possible, however, if player I 
expects to play U in the subgame, regarding it as sufficiently likely that player II 
will play L. So player II, also expecting I to play U in the subgame, should play 
L.
The conclusion is that, once the subgame has been reached, only (U,L ) is 
“conditionally rationalizable,” in the obvious sense that it is rationalized by ratio­
nalizable expectations satisfying the condition that player I’s expected payoff in 
the subgame should be at least 2. Of course, if player I foresees that this will be 
the outcome of the subgame, then player I will indeed choose to play B  and then 























































































































Another rather similar example is a slight variation on one that was first dis­
cussed by van Damme (1989, p. 479).5 The game can be regarded as an extension 
of Battle of the Sexes in which player II is given the option of setting up before­
hand a correlation device that will ensure the symmetric correlated equilibrium 
payoffs (2,2). For this example, the set of cautiously rationalizable strategies can 
be found by iteratively deleting dominated strategies as follows. First, A strictly 
dominates L for player II. But this is the only strict dominance relation, so U, D 
remain as rationalizable strategies for player I, as do A, R  for player II. However, 
after L has been eliminated, D  weakly dominates U for player I; again, this is the 
only dominance relation at this stage. Finally, after U has also been eliminated, 
R  strictly dominates A for player II, and so we are left with (£>, R) as the only 
possible outcome.
In this example, the forward induction argument leads to the same result. If 
player II foregoes the correlation option and chooses B, this can only be rational­
ized by the belief that II expects to get a payoff of at least 2 in the subgame. Thus 
player II must be intending to play R in the belief that, with probability at least 
|, player I will choose D. This leads to (£), R) as the only possible conditionally 
rationalizable outcome in the subgame. So player II is induced to enter the sub­
game and play Battle of the Sexes without a correlation device in the expectation 
of achieving this preferred outcome.
The same game can be used to illustrate the inconsistency of this kind of for­
ward induction or iterated elimination of dominated strategies with Harsanyi and 
Selten’s theory of equilibrium selection6 —  see Harsanyi and Selten (1988, Chapter 
10) and van Damme (1990) for several other examples making a similar point. For 
their theory imposes symmetry upon the (unique) solution to all symmetric games 
such as Battle of the Sexes. It follows that the only Harsanyi-Selten equilibrium
5 The only difference is that van Damme lets player II have a payoff o f  5 instead o f  2 if  
player I chooses the strategy A. It is easy to see that this makes no difference to the argument 
presented below for this particular game.
6 Such inconsistencies were kindly pointed out to me by Giacom o Costa, but using a somewhat 




























































































in the subgame is the mixed strategy symmetric equilibrium ( j t f  +  jL  +  j i î )
yielding expected payofFs (|, |). In the full game with a correlation option this 
would encourage player I to choose A, and so lead to the (mixed strategy) equi­
librium (A, \L +  jR ). This contradicts the conclusion of the previous paragraph, 
































Battle o f  the Sexes with Two Correlation Options
The game we have just been discussing is actually a subgame of another, 
considered by Dekel and Fudenberg (1990, Fig. 7.1, pp. 265-6), which can be 
regarded as a version of Battle of the Sexes allowing two correlation options. 
Indeed, compared with the previous example, player I has now also been given 
the option of using a correlation device, but a somewhat costly one, since using it 
reduces the payoffs to (1.5,1.5). As is easy to check, cautious iterated deletion of 
dominated strategies now leads to (X , R) as the unique cautiously rationalizable 





























































































Yet Dekel and Fudenberg claim that ( D, A) is also reasonable in this example. 
The reason they give is that, “if player II accepts the [ (X , R) ] solution (which is 
based on the intuition of forwards induction) and then is given the opportunity to 
play, II must conclude that ‘ something basic has changed,’ and II might conclude 
that I’s payoffs will lead I to violate the [ (D , R) ] outcome in the subgame.” In 
fact, there is a really interesting tension here between I’s attempt, by playing Y , to 
convince II that player I expects a payoff of at least 1.5, and II’s attempt, by playing 
B, to convince player I that II expects a payoff of at least 2. Without a correlation 
device, there is simply no way to fulfill both expectations simultaneously. Quite 
a likely outcome of the second subgame is that player I will choose U while II 
plays R, each thinking it likely that the other will play the alternative strategy, 
and each expecting a higher payoff than what would result from their foregone 
opportunities to play X  and A respectively.
Nevertheless, the outcome in which I plays X  still makes the most sense to me. 
After choosing Y  first, will player I really proceed with U if II plays B1 Or is player 
I more likely to realize at the last minute that II really must be intending R, and 
so play D  in the end? It seems that II has an advantage in the first subgame from 
having the last move before the second subgame starts. What is clear, anyway, 
is how, compared to standard equilibrium theory, rationalizability allows a much 
richer discussion of what players can reasonably expect of each other.
In the examples discussed so far, it was easy to find a forward induction 
argument yielding the same unique outcome as iterated elimination of ail weakly 
dominated strategies. This will not be so easy in the next example. In the form 
given here, this is originally due to Ben-Porath and Dekel (1988), though it is 
based on Em idea due to van Damme (1989, pp. 488-90) that is also discussed by 
Myerson (1991, pp. 194-5); however, the only published presentation which I have 
seen so far is in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 461-4). The game begins with 
player I having a choice between B, to be interpreted as “burning money” which 





















































































































































Ben-Porath and Dekel’s “ M oney Burning”  Example
burning money. After N  the basic payoffs Eire given by the right-hand bi-matrix, 
which is a modified form of Battle of the Sexes. After B  the payoffs Eire given by 
the left-hEmd bi-matrix. Compared with the right-hand bi-matrix, I’s payoffs have 
been reduced by 2.5, but II’s payoffs are exactly the same.
In the corresponding normal form of this game, BU, B D , N U ,N D  are the four 
strategies for player I, while L b L n , L bR n , R b Ln , R bR n are the four strategies 
for player II. Of I’s strategies, ND  strictly dominates BD  and so BD  can be elim­
inated, but all other strategies of both players remain rationalizable. Then, for 
player II, L bL n weakly dominates R bL n and L bR n weeikly dominates R b R n - 
So R bL n and R bR n are eliminated, leaving L bL n and L bR n • Once it is known 
that player II will choose L b , however, BU strictly dominates N D  for player I Eind 
so N D  CEm be eliminated. This leaves only BU  and NU  as possible cautiously 




























































































L bL n weakly dominates L b R-n , leaving L b L n as player II’s only cautiously ra- 
tionalizable strategy. This leaves NU  as player Ps only cautiously rationalizable 
strategy, and (N U ,L bL m) as the only cautiously rationalizable outcome, with 
(9,6) as the resulting payoffs.
To establish (N U ,L bL n ) as the only conditionally rationalizable outcome in 
this game, the corresponding forward induction argument has to pass backwards 
and forwards between the two different possible subgames which can occur after 
Ps first move. Notice first how, by choosing N D , player I can guarantee a payoff 
of at least 4. So if player I were to play B, it could only be in the expectation of 
obtaining at least 4 in the left-hand subgame. With conditionally rationalizable 
strategies, this is only possible if player I were to choose U expecting II to play 
L b - Thus, if player I were to choose B, it would be in the expectation of getting a 
payoff o f 6.5. Now, however, if player I were to choose N  instead, this could only 
be rationalized if player I were expecting a payoff of at least 6.5 in the right hand 
subgame following that first move. This, however, is only possible if I intends to 
play U and expects II to choose L n with a sufficiently high probability. Conditional 
rationalizability then requires player II to choose i /v , so yielding (N U ,L b L n ) as 
the only possible outcome of forward induction.
It should be pointed out that Ben-Porath and Dekel regard it as paradoxical 
that giving player I the opportunity to “bum money” in this way should confer 
an advantage in the subgame that occurs after no money has been burnt. They 
also consider a large class of games in which a similar phenomenon arises. But 
is this really any more paradoxical than the possibility which Schelling (1960, p. 
24) noticed — namely, that the potential buyers of a house could influence the 
outcome of a bargaining process with the sellers by first making a large enough 
bet with an outside party that they would not pay more than a specified price? Of 
course, the (foregone) opportunity to bum money does only affect conditionally 
rationalizable beliefs, whereas Schelling’s house buyers’ bet affects payoffs directly. 



























































































































M yerson ’s Example
My last example is due to Myerson (1991, pp. 192-3). It illustrates that there
is as yet no generally accepted concept of forward induction. To quote (with some
changes to reflect different notation):
Unfortunately, some natural forward-induction arguments may be in­
compatible with other natural backward-induction arguments. [In the 
example shown, a] forward-induction argument might suggest that, be­
cause Y D  is a weakly dominated strategy for player I, player II would 
expect player I  to choose U [in the last subgame] if he chose Y  [origi­
nally]; so player II should choose A. On the other hand, backward in­
duction determines a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium (X D ,B R ) in 
which player II would choose B [for his first move], . . .  Forward induc­
tion corresponds to interatively eliminating weakly dominated strategies 
in the order: first Y D  for player I, then BL and BR for player II, 
leaving the equilibria (X , A) and (YU, A).
In fact (X , A) is the unique cautiously rationalizable outcome. For in the 
game as a whole there are no strictly dominated strategies, so all strategies are 
rationalizable. Thereafter, on the first round of eliminating weakly dominated 




























































































(U,R ) as the only possible outcome of the last subgame. Then there are still no 
strictly dominated strategies. But both YU  for player I and BR  for player II 
get eliminated on the second round of eliminating weakly dominated strategies, 
leaving (X , A) as the only possibility.
As for Myerson’s alternative outcome (YU, A), however, it is really only cred­
ible as an outcome of this game if more reliance is placed on the logic of forward 
induction on the basis of player I’s first move than on that of either subgame 
rationalizability or forward induction on the basis of player II’s first move. For 
R  strictly dominates L in the last subgame, so subgame rationalizability leaves 
(D , R) as the only possible outcome of the last subgame. Only if player II believes 
rather strongly that player I is likely to choose U in the subgame, presumably 
expecting II to play the dominated strategy L, will II choose A over B. Moroever, 
the logic of forward induction allows player I to infer from the choice of B that 
IPs expected payoff in the subgame is at least 7, so reinforcing the claim that only 
(D ,R ) is really rationalizable in the last subgame. This leads me to claim that 
(X D , B R ) is the only convincing outcome of this game. Of course, this outcome 
both differs from and makes more sense than the unique cautiously rationalizable 
outcome (X , A). So forward induction can suggest different strategy combinations 
from cautious rationalizability, even though the consequences of (X D , B R ) and 
(X , A) are, of course, entirely the same in this example.
That concludes the series of examples which make up this section. They 
show how powerful forward induction arguments can be, but they still need to be 
formalized for general extensive and normal form games before any of their general 
implications can be deduced. As yet I know of no general theorems relating forward 
induction to cautious rationalizability. Nor do I yet know of an accepted general 
definition of forward induction, even though Hillas (1990, p. 1368), for example, 
offers one that works well enough for his purposes.
One clear conclusion does emerge, however. In each of the subgames dis­




























































































induction depends on which options the players in the subgame had renounced 
beforehand. An adequate description of the subgame therefore requires specifying 
these foregone options, as well as the usual extensive form of the subgame. By itself 
that may not be too controversial even though, as van Damme (1989) points out, 
it amounts to admitting that phenomena like “sunk costs” may be relevant after 
all in subgames. Notice, however, that a subgame is itself a game. The fact that 
the extensive form is an inadequate description of a subgame therefore suggests 
that it may not be an adequate description of a full game either. Indeed, faced 
with a particular game in extensive form to analyse, the examples of this section 
suggest that the game theorist should at least be asking what outside options the 
players may have given up in the past, before the game even started, since these 
will influence players’ (conditionally) rationalizable expectations concerning what 
should happen in the course of the game itself. Of course, foregone options are only 
one of a host of extraneous features which may help to determine rationalizable 
expectations in the game. One of the benefits of replacing equilibrium analysis 
with considerations of rationalizability is precisely that such considerations, which 
do seem to influence the outcomes of actual games, can be brought into the game- 
theoretic analysis. The obvious disadvantage is that much less precise conclusions 
are possible, yet such precision should not replace realism.
5. Conclusions
Harsanyi and Selten (19S8, pp. 342-3), amongst others, clearly point out 
how equilibrium theory sets itself the worthy goal of determining both what ac­
tions and also what “rational” or equilibrium expectations should arise in gen­
eral non-cooperative games. Usually, this goal is not achievable, even in games 
with unique Nash equilibria (Bernheim, 1986). Instead, the less demanding re­
quirement of rationalizability seems much more reasonable, since it permits each 
player to be uncertain about what other players believe, unlike the strait-jacket 
of equilibrium. Besides, it is just enough to allow individual players to have ap­




























































































axe uncertain in the game, including both the strategies and the expectations 
of all the other players (see Tan and Werlang, 1988). Correlated strategies and 
forward induction also appear to make more sense in the context of rationaliz- 
able rather than rational expectations. In addition, when each player is allowed 
to have correlated expectations regarding the strategies of all the other players, 
then rationalizable strategies are precisely those which survive iterated removal 
of strictly dominated strategies, whereas “cautiously” rationalizable strategies are 
those which survive “cautious” iterated removal of dominated strategies. And the 
intuition of forward induction seems to be well captured in a form of “conditional 
rationalizability” that excludes all beliefs giving a lower expected payoff to any 
player than the best outside option which that player is known to have passed up 
beforehand.
Rationalizability therefore removes some difficulties that equilibrium theory 
has created unnecessarily. Several anomalies remain, however. For example, the 
prevalence of tit-for-tat in finite repetitions of prisoners’ dilemma is no more con­
sistent with rationalizability than with equilibrium theory. This and other related 
anomalies may well need explaining by some “bounded” version of rationalizability 
instead, recognizing players’ inability to formulate excessively complicated models 
of the game they are playing (cf. Hammond, 1990). In particular, it is once again 
easier to contemplate bounds on rationalizable models rather them on rational or 
equilibrium models that represent each player’s expectations concerning the game. 
As always, however, there is much work left to do, partly on bounded rational­
izability, but also on unbounded rationalizability which was the subject of this 
paper.
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